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THE GEORGE A. LEET BUSINESS 
LAW SYMPOSIUM: 
THE ROLE OF LA WYERS IN 
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 
INTRODUCTION 
The rapid proliferation of strategic alliances - such as joint 
ventures, dealerships, franchises, and licenses - is transforming the 
way the world does business. Alliances have become indispensa-
ble in many industries due to globalization and to the acceleration 
of technological change. To flourish in these industries a firm 
must access foreign markets and develop new technologies quicker 
than it is capable of on its own; it must gain the resources of an-
other firm through a business alliance. Those resources may be 
financial or in the form of expertise, as in technology or market-
ing. 
The growth of alliances is also spurred by two new forces that 
pose a dilemma for firms. One is pressure to concentrate on a 
firm's core competencies and shed activities where competitors 
have greater expertise. We have learned that conglomeration is 
bad and focus is good. The other trend is to insist that firms not 
stand pat but constantly seek new sources of profit. To satisfy 
these seemingly incompatible demands, firms often try to maintain 
their focus while expanding their activities by partnering with 
firms that have complementary strengths. In the past, suppliers 
and customers dealt through ordinary contracts, but alliances better 
allow firms to speed innovation while maintaining flexibility to 
adapt to rapidly fluctuating market conditions. 
Alliances are also transforming the work of business lawyers. 
In alliances the parties must trust and cooperate with each other 
much more than in the financings and acquisitions that are the tra-
ditional staples of corporate practice. As a consequence, in nego-
tiating and drafting contracts for alliances lawyers must not only 
master a new set of substantive terms but assume a new demeanor, 
one that fosters such trust and cooperation. 
857 
858 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:857 
Unfortunately, legal academia has almost completely ignored 
this trend. Finance and business authors have generated reams of 
books and articles poring over the theoretical and practical issues 
of alliances, but in law the literature comprises little more than the 
proceedings of a few continuing legal education programs. The 
probable reasons for this oversight are illuminating. Traditionally, 
firms acquire goods and services in one of two ways: they either 
"make" them within the firm or "buy" them in market purchase 
contracts. In legal academia, the former is covered in business 
associations; the latter, in contracts. Strategic alliances do not fit 
into either established category and seem to be falling between the 
cracks. 
George A. Leet endowed the Business Law Symposium to 
tackle new issues and to cultivate imaginative analyses and solu-
tions; therefore, this Symposium marks the first serious effort by 
legal academia to study strategic alliances. Since alliances differ 
from other business transactions fundamentally and not merely in 
technical details, any serious examination of alliances must incor-
porate several perspectives. One of these is a traditional legal 
analysis of the consequences of choosing a particular form of 
business organization (such as the joint venture) and of various 
contract terms. Another is a corporate finance analysis that inves-
tigates how alliances allocate property rights and address agency 
costs so as to maximize the parties' profit. Both these approaches 
rely on insights from psychology and sociology regarding how 
trust and cooperation are created and maintained so as to minimize 
risk to both parties. 
To this spectrum of disciplinary perspectives must be added 
another set of perspectives, those of the various players in the 
game. First there are the parties, whose interests vary depending 
on their financial resources, the significance of the particular alli-
ance within the firm, the inputs that they offer to the alliance, and 
the benefits that they hope to reap from it. Then there are the law-
yers, who may be outside or in-house counsel. Finally, there are 
investment bankers, accountants, and others who advise the parties 
or facilitate the transaction. 
The speakers for this Symposium bring a wealth of experience 
and represent a wide variety of these perspectives. Our first prin-
cipal speaker, Stephen Fraidin, is a distinguished corporate lawyer 
who has also taught in law schools and written extensively about 
business transactions. 1 His article focuses on the control issues in 
1 See Stephen Fraidin & Radu Lelutiu, Strategic Alliances and C01porate Control, 53 
CASE W. REs. L. REV. 865 (2003). 
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strategic alliances, especially where one partner in the alliance 
makes an equity investment in the other. In some cases this in-
vestment is complemented by a right of the investing company to 
acquire its partner. Alternatively, the investing company may 
make a takeover bid for its partner. What contract terms are desir-
able to cover these possibilities? And what are the fiduciary duties 
of the investing company to its partner? 
The first commentator on Fraidin' s article is another distin-
guished corporate lawyer and an alumna of our law school, Jeanne 
Rickert, who explores three issues in strategic alliances.2 First, 
trust and cooperation in an alliance depend heavily on what will 
happen when the alliance terminates. The lawyers must help the 
parties in negotiating the alliance to focus on that issue which, in 
their desire to think positively and avoid conflict, they might pre-
fer to ignore. Second, there is an inherent conflict of interest when 
an officer, who owes allegiance to the partner who is her em-
ployer, also participates in the governance of the alliance, where 
she owes duties to both partners. She notes that courts have not 
resolved this conflict, so it behooves the parties to work it out by 
contract. Third, non-competition clauses between partners can 
raise sticky problems when one partner is acquired by a company 
that competes with the other partner. 
The second commentator on the morning panel is Dan Austin, 
a prominent investment banker in mergers, acquisitions, and alli-
ances.3 He notes the potential problems when partners have dif-
ferent goals, like creating jobs on one side and maximizing profits 
on the other. Next he discusses how detailed alliance agreements 
should be arranged. Partners want to maintain flexibility to meet 
unexpected circumstances and to avoid haggling over contingen-
cies that could undermine trust and cooperation, but a thoughtful, 
thorough set of rules can enhance trust and cooperation. 
Following the comments was a lively colloquy among the 
panelists and the large audience, which included several experi-
enced participants in business alliances. Among the issues dis-
cussed were the need for lengthier negotiations than in other deals 
because the parties have to reach mutually acceptable terms; the 
difficult role of lawyers and the need for business people to talk 
without lawyers present; the desirability of arbitration and other 
2 See Jeanne M. Rickert, Keep Your Eyes Open: Avoiding Unillfended Consequences in 
Joim Vellture Relationships, 53 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 897 (2003). 
3 See Daniel F. Austin, A Businesspersons' Perspective Concerning Joint Ventures, 53 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905 (2003). 
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dispute resolution clauses; and the possible benefits of outside ad-
visors. 
The main speaker on the first afternoon program was Rachelle 
Sampson, a finance and management scholar who also holds a law 
degree.4 She begins by noting that an alliance can entail either 
profit-sharing, perhaps through a separate entity (like a joint ven-
ture partnership or corporation), or a contract with stipulated con-
sideration instead of profit-sharing. She then asks under what cir-
cumstances either of these is preferable to the other. One approach 
by scholars to this issue focuses on the allocation of property 
rights to induce the most efficient investments by the partners. 
Another approach - transaction cost economics - focuses on pro-
tecting a partner who has made an investment from holdup by the 
other party, who may refuse to cooperate after the investment has 
been made. 
In theory, an equity (or profit-sharing) alliance (like a joint 
venture) is more suited for complex arrangements, where it is dif-
ficult to specify the rights and duties of the parties in advance, in 
order to monitor the partners' compliance and to enforce the con-
tract by proving a breach if one occurs. Equity joint ventures are 
not always optimal, though. They are often too costly to set up 
and operate in simpler transactions where a traditional contract 
will suffice. Another determinant of alliance structure is whether 
there are prior dealings between the parties or a social network 
within an industry that reduce moral hazard problems so that 
costly formal structures are not needed. 
Professor Sampson measures this theory against her empirical 
study of alliances. She gauged the complexity of a number of eq-
uity and non-equity alliances and then ascertained how many pat-
ents each alliance succeeded in obtaining. She finds that in com-
plex alliances the equity joint venture outperforms the pure con-
tract mode, but that in simpler alliances the opposite is true. In 
short, practice confirms theory; structure matters. 
She also looked at alliance successes as a function of prior al-
liance experience. She found that the more alliances you do, the 
better you get at them; that recent experience is more valuable than 
older experience; and that experience is most important for success 
in equity joint ventures - i.e., alliances with highly uncertain ac-
tivities. During the symposium colloquy, she also noted that firms 
with wide experience in alliances have begun to institutionalize 
their alliance design and management processes. She concludes 
4 See Rachelle C. Sampson, The Role of Lawyers in Strategic Alliances, 53 CASE W. 
RES. L. REv. 909 (2003). . 
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that since structure matters and lawyers can play a critical role in 
designing alliances structures, lawyers should not be excluded or 
slighted in negotiating alliances. 
The first commentator on Professor Sampson's presentation 
was Professor Susan Helper, an economist at our Weatherhead 
School of Management who has, inter alia, closely studied sup-
plier-customer relations in the automobile industry.5 She first 
notes that factors that were omitted from Professor Sampson's 
study, rather than choice of alliance structure, could account for 
differences in there success - i.e., we cannot necessarily conclude 
that alliances that obtained fewer patents chose the wrong struc-
ture. She also discusses how one or both partners may have other 
goals than to maximize the number of patents obtained. For ex-
ample, one partner may be primarily interested to learn more about 
a product, industry, or market. 
She discusses how a major purpose of an alliance may also be 
to get acquainted with a partner with whom one may eventually 
want a closer relationship. Accordingly, alliance partners typically 
start with a small project and progress to larger, more complex 
projects if their initial experiences are positive. In such cases, mu-
tual trust accumulated over time may substitute for carefully 
drafted contract provisions and control structures. 
Finally, Professor Helper suggests that lawyers may play a 
significant role in designing the proper incentives, like incentives 
to encourage people to share information. Toward this end it may 
be desirable to de-emphasize more traditional legal concerns, like 
intellectual property rights. 
The second commentator on Professor Sampson was Sanjiv 
Kapur, a corporate lawyer with wide experience in international 
alliances. 6 He noted that the terms of ail alliance may be influ-
enced by its purpose; e.g., whether it entails cross-border market-
ing as opposed to research and development. He also noted that 
legal issues, like firm liability, fiduciary duties, and the need for a 
domestic partner in a foreign market, influence choice of alliance 
structure. 
He then listed some potentially significant business considera-
tions not previously mentioned. For example, some firms want an 
alliance to be a separate entity in order to encourage the individu-
als participating in the alliance to identify with it and to be ex-
5 See Susan R. Helper, Governing Alliances: Advancing Knowledge and Controlling 
Opportunism, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 929 (2003). 
6 See Sanijv K. Kapur, Structuring and Negotiating International Joillt Venntres: Anec-
dotal Evidence from a Large Law Firm Practice, 53 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 937 (2003). 
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posed to a new culture. Accounting and tax considerations may 
also play a role. He agreed with Professor Sampson that complex-
ity weighs in favor of an equity joint venture structure. 
Finally, Mr. Kapur discussed his experience with several deals 
that either were never consummated or fell apart. In both contexts 
he noted the importance of changing needs and circumstances. He 
later noted that one kind of significant change is a change in the 
personnel in one partner, since trust rests partly on personal con-
tact. Further, he discusses how the facts regarding each deal are 
unique, so that generalizations are hazardous. During the sympo-
sium colloquy, he discussed the importance of providing for termi-
nation since so many alliances do eventually unravel. 
The last presentation was my own, which focused on the prob-
lems lawyers face because strategic alliances are so different from 
the other business transactions they usually handle.7 First, the 
goals of partners vary and may not be apparent to the lawyer. 
Second, although partners often shun protracted negotiations and 
long, detailed agreements, the lawyer may be blamed if the client 
comes to grief because of a gap in the contract. Accordingly, the 
lawyer must consult with the Client about its goals, its expecta-
tions, and its willingness to assume various risks more than in 
other deals. 
Alliances involve complex situations with great uncertainty 
that can never be completely eliminated by a detailed contract, so 
the parties must rely more on trust than on legal enforcement of 
contract terms. This, too, is unusual and problematic for lawyers. 
The role of advocate or hired gun that is instilled in lawyers can 
backfire by eroding the trust that is crucial to the success of an al-
liance. Instead, the lawyer has to strive for win-win solutions to 
problems that will please the other party, without neglecting the 
needs of the client. 
The need of partners to trust and cooperate, often for many 
years, means that lawyers face greater difficulties in designing 
governance and termination mechanisms and protecting confiden-
tial information and property rights from opportunism. For the 
same reasons, disagreements are likely to occur, but litigation is 
impractical if the alliance is to continue. Therefore, the lawyer 
must devise dispute resolution mechanisms that maintain trust and 
cooperation. Because alliances are so diverse, lawyers cannot re-
sort to their favorite drafting technique, which is simply to change 
7 See George W. Dent, Jr., The Role of Lawyers in Strategic Alliances, 53 CASE W. RES. 
L. REv. 953 (2003). 
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the names from their last deal. Training lawyers to handle these 
problems will require major changes in legal education. 
Although diversity is often trumpeted as a strength, it is often 
an obstacle to the creation of trust; people tend to trust those who 
are like themselves and to distrust those who are different. Soci-
ologists and psychologists have discussed techniques for overcom-
ing distrust born of diversity, and lawyers need to know these 
techniques. However, Professor Sampson noted in later colloquy 
that, despite the difficulties of fostering trust between diverse peo-
ple, alliances of diverse parties often produce superior results. 
The first commentator on my presentation was Hewitt Shaw, a 
respected tax lawyer. 8 He argued that, despite the need for trust 
between allies, efficiency is served when each lawyer zealously 
represents his client. However, in so doing a lawyer must act with 
more finesse and understanding for the situation than in many 
other commercial arrangements. He stressed that often partners 
have very different firm cultures. For an alliance to succeed, the 
parties and their lawyers must recognize and cope with these dif-
ferences. The lawyer's instinct to identify questions and nail down 
answers is extremely useful in this regard. 
Mr. Shaw noted that after a contract is signed, the partners of-
ten disregard it; instead, they use the contract as a backup in case 
major disputes arise. Nonetheless, the process of reaching agree-
ment is an important step in educating the partners as to what to 
expect from the alliance. He stressed that the shorter, less com-
prehensive contracts that business people often profess to favor 
can be both difficult to draft and dangerous in their incomplete-
ness. He advised lawyers to alert their clients to gaps in the agree-
ment. 
Shaw reminded us that the trust needed for alliances is not 
blind faith. It rests largely on understanding how the partner's 
goals coincide with one's own and how they differ. Such a clear-
eyed understanding is necessary to avoid unrealistic expectations 
about one's partner. Shaw also discussed the difficult questions of 
loyalty that can arise when a lawyer for one partner is asked to ad-
vise management of an alliance while also owing duties to the 
other party. 
The last commentator in the Symposium was Wendy Shiba, a 
former professor of law, who contributed the unique perspective of 
8 See Hewitt B. Shaw, Jr., The Role of Outside Counsel in Forming Strategic Alliances, 
53 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 965 (2003). 
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the in-house counsel.9 She began by noting that the common com-
parison of alliances to marriage is problematic because, unlike 
spouses, partners often enter an alliance because of their differ-
ences and their contrasting strengths, and not because of their 
compatibility. She further noted that the design of the alliance de-
pends in part on whether the partners expect to remain separate or 
whether they see the alliance as possibility leading to an acquisi-
tion. 
Ms. Shiba reiterated Steve Fraidin' s point that change-in-
control clauses can wreak havoc and therefore should be reviewed 
carefully by lawyer and client. Related thereto, she stressed the 
importance of due diligence to determine, inter alia, whether the 
possible partner has change-in-control or non-competition agree-
ments that might interfere with the proposed alliance. She also 
reiterated the importance of fiduciary duties; e.g., clarifying the 
fiduciary obligations of employees of a partner who will be direc-
tors or agents of the alliance. 
Shiba discussed the role of in-house counsel, particularly the im-
portance of maintaining an independent voice, even if it means advis-
ing the business people to abandon a deal to which they are emotion-
ally committed. She repeated the importance of getting the lawyer 
involved early in the deal and noted that in-house counsel may enjoy 
an advantage in that regard. As Jeanne Rickert noted in later collo-
quy, in-house counsel usually understands the firm's business better 
than outside counsel can. Ms. Shiba suggested that outside counsel 
should try to learn the client's business by arranging tours and brief-
ings without charge to the client. She also mentioned alternative bill-
ing strategies that might benefit both client and lawyer. Finally, she 
suggested that business people are becoming disenchanted with com-
plex joint venture arrangements and may be moving to simpler alli-
ances, like licensing agreements. 
This Leet Symposium is the first such event in legal academia 
to focus on strategic alliances; it certainly will not be the last. The 
economic importance of alliances is large and growing rapidly. 
Alliances are also increasingly important to lawyers and the law, 
but neither lawyers nor legal scholars have adequately addressed 
the distinctive problems that alliances create. I hope that this Sym-
posium will ignite an interest in resolving this shortcoming. 
GEORGE W. DENT, JR. t 
9 See Wendy C. Shiba, Representation of Joint Ventures: A Practical Perspective from 
In-House Counsel, 53 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 971 (2003). 
t Schott-vanden Eynden Professor of Business Organizations Law, School of Law, Case 
Western Reserve University. 
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES AND 
CORPORATE CONTROL 
Stephen Fraidint and Radu Lelutiu* 
INTRODUCTION 
News about the formation and dissolution of joint ventures 
seems to be a permanent feature of today' s business world. 1 Yet, 
the recent proliferation of the joint venture form was hardly a sur-
prise. Numerous authors writing at the beginning at the 1990s sig-
naled that the joint venture would become a preferred vehicle for 
the pursuit of corporate opportunities, one that under the right cir-
cumstances is preferable to outright acquisition and a favored 
means through which companies would seek to enhance their abil-
ity to compete in the global markets.2 These predictions were un-
doubtedly correct, as the last decade has witnessed both an un-
precedented increase in the number of joint ventures formed 
around the globe,3 and an unexpected complexity in the nature of 
the agreements that govern alliances.4 
t Partner at Kirkland & Ellis, New York. 
t Student at Columbia Law School. 
I The Article uses "joint venture" and "strategic alliance" interchangeably. 
2 See, e.g., J. Michael Schell & Marc J. Segalman, New Deal Structures in the 1990's: 
Mergers of Equals and Strategic Alliances, in CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL i991 575 
(PLI Corp. Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 731, 1991) (discussing the factors that made 
strategic alliances a method of investment preferable to the straight acquisition and noting that 
the then-recent decision of the Supreme Court of Delaware in Paramount Communications, Inc. 
v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990), recognizing long-term corporate goals as a concern 
that a company's board of directors may legitimately entertain, made the 1990s an opportune 
time for engaging in strategic alliances); see also Stephen M. Besen, An Oven,iew of Strategic 
Alliances, 8 No.7 INSIGHTS 22 (1994) ('"Strategic alliance' is a buzzword of the 1990s. One 
can scarcely open a newspaper without reading about the latest alliance and the tremendous 
potential opportunities for its participants. From large scale alliances such as British Tele-
com/MCI, Time Warner/US West and British Air/US Air to start-ups like 3DO or General 
Magic, large and small companies are seeking strategic partners to enter new markets, develop 
new products and technologies, promote new standards or otherwise cooperate to gain advan-
tages in the marketplace."). 
3 See, e.g., Jeff Coburn, All for One: Strategic Alliances Between Firms Are Good for 
Clients, Business, 17 No.5 LEGAL MGMT., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 46-47 ("[I]f the 1980s was the 
'Decade of the Merger/Acquisition' then the 1990s is becoming the 'Decade of the Strategic 
Alliance."'). 
4 See Stephen Fraidin & Douglas Pepe, Emerging Challenges of Joint Venture Transac-
tions, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: CURRENT AND EMERGING ISSUES 1998 349, 358 (ALI-
ABACourseofStudy,Nov.12-13,1998). 
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As a result, especially over the past decade, joint ventures 
have received a lot of attention from practitioners, as well as from 
legal and economic scholars. A survey of prior literature, how-
ever, reveals that the overwhelming body of existing articles in the 
area attempt to answer concrete pragmatic questions, and most of-
ten, "how to implement a successful joint venture." While keeping 
these important practical aspects in mind, this Article approaches 
the joint venture concept from a slightly different perspective and 
addresses a related yet distinct set of concerns- namely, the inter-
play between the joint venture agreement and the impact of the 
alliance on the joint venturers, both in terms of governance and 
control. The authors believe that the success of a strategic alliance 
can be maximized if the impact of its underlying arrangement on 
aspects of governance and control of the venturers is understood.5 
To that end, this Article raises a number of questions. 
The Article begins by exploring the complex fiduciary duty 
issues that arise in the context of joint venture agreements. Draw-
ing on existing scholarship, the Article argues that vexing dilem-
mas are likely to mark the destiny of such joint enterprises. The 
common nature of joint venture agreements, together with likely 
changes in the ownership and business strategies of the parent 
companies, make such issues unavoidable. To alleviate those di-
lemmas and to prevent opportunism, the Article argues that when 
contemplating a joint venture arrangement, certain companies 
should try to encourage their potential business ally to issue equity 
for their benefit in connection with the joint venture. 6 Further, the 
Article warns that, despite their beneficial impact, these decisions 
raise a number of difficulties and are potentially subject to judicial 
scrutiny under the more exacting standard set forth by the Dela-
5 By "success," this Article means not only fmancial gain for the joint venturers, but also 
the lack of discord and the maximization of cooperation between the members of the alliance. 
As scholars oftentimes note, the term "success" in the context of strategic alliances has a more 
opaque meaning than in usual circumstances. See George Dent, Lawyers and Trust in Business 
Alliances, 58 Bus. LAw. 45, 60 (2002) ("[G]oals are often vaguer in alliances than in other 
deals; the aim may be no more specific than the optimal exploitation of each other's research 
capabilities."). 
6 This is indeed oftentimes done in practice. This Article does not address the antitrust 
concerns that might surround cross-equity joint ventures. According to the authors' research, no 
articles have addressed this discrete issue. For general treatment of the antitrust issues raised by 
joint venture agreements, see Ronan P. Harty, Joint Ventures and Antitrust, in INTERNATIONAL 
JOINT VENTURES 2002 99 (PLI Comm. Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 835, 2002); 
Joseph F. Bradley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1521 (1982); Richard 
J. Hoskins, Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures and Competitor Collaborations: A Primer for 
the Corporate Lawyer, 10 U. MIAMI. Bus. L. REv. 119 (2002); Gregory J. Werden, Antitrust 
Analysis of Joint Ventures: An Overview, 66 ANTITRUST L. J. 701 (1998). 
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ware Supreme Court in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co} and 
other cases that follow Unocal. The Article suggests that, in order 
. for those decisions to be immune from judicial second-guessing, 
the parents should carefully examine the implications of these eq-
uity investments, while aiming to comply with a heightened stan-
dard of care. 
The Article is divided into five parts. Part I commences by 
discussing joint ventures in general and then proceeds to explore 
the business purposes served by these entities. Part II discusses 
two themes of interest from the existing legal scholarship which 
have a bearing on the issue of corporate control. Specifically, Part 
II traces two debates: (1) whether joint venture agreements should 
be negotiated so as to include as many details as possible (the 
"thorough contracting" approach), or so as to only outline the basic 
terms of the parties' agreement (the "flexibility" approach); and 
(2) the status of fiduciary duties in the context of joint venture 
agreements. Part III attempts to illustrate the practical dilemmas 
that confront the parents of a joint venture. It does so by reproduc-
ing and analyzing the history of Time Warner Entertainment, a 
celebrated joint venture whose lengthy destiny not only illustrates 
the venturers' expectations vis-a-vis the alliance, but also how un-
expected developments can lead them to impasses once their re-
spective paths diverge. Building on the previous sections, Part IV 
explores the desirability of equity investment arrangements under-
taken in connection with joint venture agreements. This section 
sets forth several factors whose presence might make equity in-
vestments in the potential business partner desirable for one or 
both parent companies. Finally, Part V discusses specific issues of 
corporate governance and control that arise in the context of joint 
ventures with an equity component, and suggests solutions for ef-
fectively dealing with such challenges. 
I. BUSINESS PURPOSES SERVED BY THE JOINT VENTURE 
AGREEMENT 
The joint venture, also known as a strategic alliance, is a 
means by which parties pool their resources and combine their ef-
forts for profit.8 An overview of the various types of ventures or-
7 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (noting that a fiduciary duty exists to protect the corporate 
enterprise, which includes protecting stockholders from reasonably perceived harm, and requir-
ing reasonable and good faith grounds for corporate actions). 
8 See 46 AM. JUR 2Dloint Ventures§ 1 (1994) ("A joint venture is frequently defined as 
an association of two or more persons formed to carry out a single business enterprise for profit. 
More specifically, it is an association of persons with intent ... to engage in and carry out a 
single business venture for joint profit, for which purpose such persons combine their property, 
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ganized in the 1990s reveals that they can be categorized in seven 
categories: technology distribution ventures; cross-licensing ar-
rangements and joint product development ventures; industry co-
ordination ventures; research consortia; start-up ventures; access to 
foreign markets arrangements; and, 'no paradigm' ventures.9 
The explanations conventionally offered for the parties' will-
ingness to form joint ventures are straightforward: parties unite 
their individual resources with an expectation that the resulting 
whole will be greater than the sum of its constituent parts. 10 As 
such, cooperative alliances adequately answer efficiency concerns 
and provide complex competitive and synergistic advantages over 
traditional investment arrangements. 11 Modern strategic alliances 
respond to concerns that fall in five categories: geographical ac-
cess concerns; risk minimization; access to strategic resources and 
globalization concerns; marketing, joint product development, and 
network benefits; and the synergy test. 
A. Geographical Access Concerns 
The fall of the Iron Curtain and the recent shifting political 
paradigms across the globe were followed by the emergence of 
previously untapped markets which displayed great investment 
money, effects, skill, and knowledge .... "); see also Ron Ben-Yehuda, Joint Ventures, in 
STRUCfURING, NEGOTIATING & IMPLEMENTING STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 2001 247 (PLI Corp. 
Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 1260, 2001) (A joint venture typically involves "an asso-
ciation of economically independent business entities (the 'Venturers') for a common commer-
cial purpose of defined scope and duration, by contract or in the form of a new business entity, 
and by means of which the Venturers pool resources and share risks, rewards and control .... "); 
cf Bradley, supra note 6, at 1526 ("(A] joint venture may be defined for antitrust purposes as an 
integration of operations between two or more separate firms, in which the following conditions 
are present: (1) the enterprise is under the joint control of the parent firms, which are not under 
related control; (2) each parent makes a substantial contribution to the joint enterprise; (3) the 
enterprise exists as a business entity separate from its parents; and ( 4) the joint venture creates 
significant new enterprise capability in terms of new productive capacity, new technology, a 
new product, or entry into a new market."). 
9 Fraidin & Pepe, supra note 4, at 352-55. 
10 V. Scott Killingsworth, Form, Function and Fairness: Structuring the Technology Joint 
Venture, 15 No.3 COMPUTER LAW, Mar. 1998, at 1, 3. 
11 See Richard D. Harroch, Strategic Alliances, in STRUCfURING, NEGOTIATING & IM-
PLEMENTING STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 1997 121 (PLI Corp. Practice Course, Handbook Series 
No. 1002, 1997) (listing benefits of strategic alliances and providing comparisons among strate-
gic alliances and other alternatives); KATHRYN RUDIE HARRIGAN, MANAGING FOR JOINT VEN-
TURE SuccESS 17 (1986) (listing among one of the competitive advantages that joint ventures 
allow firms to gain larger access to capital); see also Ben-Y ehuda, supra note 8 (noting that 
joint ventures allow for the pooling of resources and the sharing of risks); Bradley, supra note 6, 
at 1525 ("By integrating certain operations of the participating firms, a joint venture creates 
additional productive capacity through the formation of a new producing organization, the de-
velopment of a new product or technology, or the entry into a new market."). 
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potential. 12 However, most, if not all, of these markets were regu-
lated by arcane and parochial laws and were controlled by biased 
law-enforcing institutions. 13 The risk of dispute resolution before 
one of these tribunals and the impossibility of compliance with 
complicated regulatory schemes made traditional-type corporate 
entities a risky option for investors interested in pursuing opportu-
nities in the newly-discovered markets. 14 
Oftentimes developed to deal with local, cultural, or social 
barriers to investment in a particular locale, the joint venture 
agreement attempts to circumvent these geography-related con-
cerns. 
15 For instance, a Western investor that wishes to pursue a 
business opportunity abroad may be deterred by requirements such 
as local incorporation, certain mandatory quotas of local owner-
ship, or compliance with unfavorable local laws. However, be-
cause the joint venture form is a creature of contract, 16 the avail-
ability of strategic alliance arrangements allows foreign investors 
to circumvent the necessity of local incorporation and that of com-
pliance with complicated local regulatory mechanisms. 17 This al-
ternative also allows parties to minimize their amenability to suit 
in the local courts that they perceive as inadequate, since the pref-
erable option of arbitration before government-neutral or other im-
partial tribunals is available through contract negotiations. 18 
12 Blaine V. Fogg & Stephen F. Arcana, Strategic Partnerships and Alliances, in ACQUI-
SITIONS, MERGERS, SPIN-OFFS AND OTHER RESTRUCTURINGS 1993 407,411 (PLI Corp. Practice 
Course, Handbook Series No. 825, 1993) (noting the increasing globalization of business in the 
early 1990s due to political changes such as the fall of the Iron Curtain). · 
13 See, e.g., GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 7 {2d ed. 2001) 
(describing the benefits of arbitration in such markets). 
14 See Erika P. Schultz, Joilll Venture Agreements: A New Mechanism for Investing in 
Colombia, 12 WoRLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 190 (2001) (explaining that the joint venture 
provides a way of avoiding a regulated formal process and a mechanism for deciding any dis-
putes). 
15 See generally Steven R. Salbu, Parental Coordination and Conflict in International 
Joillf Ventures: The Use of Contract to Address Legal, Linguistic, and Cultural Concerns, 43 
CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1221 (1993) (analyzing the role of joint ventures in transactional busi-
ness activity). 
16 See 46 AM. JUR 2D Joint J!emures § 18 (1994) ('The rights, duties, and obligations of 
joint venturers, as between themselves, depend primarily upon the terms of the contract by 
which they assumed that relationship."). 
17 See Schultz, supra note 14, at 191 (noting that because joint venture have a specific 
purpose stipulated by agreement, they do not require the incorporation of a new legal entity, and 
allow parties to escape local regulatory procedures and to structure their relationships as they 
please). 
IB See Hans Smit, The Future of lmenzationol Commercial Arbitration: A Single TI·ollSno-
tional Institution?, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 8, 9 (1986) ("Rather than permit international 
disputes to be settled in national courts, many parties often prefer to submit them to a tribunal 
that is not part of the governmental structure of a particular state .... Nationalistic favoritism 
can ... be avoided by selecting a forum in a neutral state .... "). Notably, most developing na-
tions, and all of the former communist states, are signatories to the United Nations Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10, 1958 (the New 
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B. Risk Minimization 
The economic instability which typically characterizes emerg-
ing markets made entrepreneurs interested in pursuing the new 
possibilities cautious. Would-be investors believed that substantial 
traditional-type cash investments were threatened by uncharted 
risks. 19 Additionally, as already stated, the legal uncertainty sur-
rounding the new markets heightened the level of insecurity and 
consequently the potential investors' sense of discomfort.20 
The concept of joint venture provides a simple answer to these 
problems. Its essential characteristics - profit sharing and risk 
minimization - make the joint venture form a particularly suitable 
method for reaching toward potentially profitable but uncertain 
markets. 21 
C. Access to Strategic Resources and Globalization Concerns 
From an economic perspective, the increase in the number and 
types of joint venture agreements was an answer to the perceived 
need for serving global clients. 22 Simply put, in industries where 
capital investment was prohibitively high and required a substan-
tial time commitment, the cooperation fostered by the joint venture 
form provides a most desirable altemative. 23 Resorting to joint 
venture agreements not only allows local companies to export their 
York Convention), codified at 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1999). The New York Convention was a signifi-
cant step toward enforcement of arbitration provisions contained in contracts that fall within its 
scope, and similarly, toward the enforcement of arbitral awards. 
19 See Steven R. Salbu & Richard Brahm, Planning Versus Contracting for International 
Joint Venture Success: The Case for Replacing Contract With Strategy, 31 COLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 283 (1993) [hereinafter Planning Versus Contracting] (pointing out that most strategic 
alliances target volatile and unpredictable environments, extend into cultures unfamiliar or 
uncomfortable with Western corporate notions, and are chosen by parties for their peculiar 
ability to meet the demands of succeeding under such conditions or, in other words, for their 
ability of "riding the wave."). 
20 See id. 
21 See Fogg & Arcana, supra note 12, at 414-16 (noting that, while risks still exist in the 
context of joint venture agreements, the parties have the option of addressing them ex ante, a 
fact which makes the joint venture a less risky investment method than an acquisition); see also 
discussion infra. 
22 See Coburn, supra note 3, at 46; see also William J. Kolasky, Jr., Structuring, Negotiat-
ing & Implementing Strategic Alliances: Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for Strategic Alli-
ances, 1063 PLI/CORP 499, 502 (1998) (noting that strategic alliance arrangements are becom-
ing increasingly more important to global competitiveness). 
23 See Rafiq Al-Shahbaz, Note, Joint Ventures, ASEAN and the Global High Technology 
Industry, 18 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 327 (1993) (arguing for a rethinking of the treatment of joint 
ventures to encourage entrepreneurship and cooperation in industries where capital investment 
is prohibitively high and requires years of development to produce competitive consumer prod-
ucts). 
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products to distant markets with minimal costs,24 but it also eases 
the movement "from vertical to 'virtual' integration."25 As a re-
sult, companies focused on adding value in the areas where they 
excel are able to "off-load and manage the rest of the value chain 
through cooperative relationships and alliances."26 Entering into 
strategic alliances allows parties to become more competitive and 
efficient through the sharing of facilities and data in unconcen-
trated or moderately concentrated markets.27 This process results 
in substantial savings which, in turn, are passed on to the consum-
ers.28 
D. Marketing, Joint Product Development, and Network Benefits 
On a closely related point, from a technology point of view, 
the 1990s witnessed the climax of high technology and industries 
characterized by short product cycles, technical interdependence of 
products, fluid standards, and globalization of markets.29 Given 
the prevailing market conditions, former competitors soon realized 
the difficulties inherent in exploiting the full potential of new in-
ventions before they became obsolete.30 Additionally, the complex 
fusion of computer, communications, and consumer electronics 
industries made it plain that the former competitors needed to col-
laborate in order to survive and remain competitive. 31 
Because a strategic alliance can take the shape of cross-
licensing agreements, joint marketing or distribution and sale 
agreements, joint product development arrangements, or various 
consortia, it provides an effective response to the short-lived prod-
uct cycles and ensuing necessity to quickly exploit a product's full 
potential before it becomes obsolete. 32 
24 See Scott C. Withrow, Strategic Alliance for Small Businesses (with Form), PRAC. 
LAw, July 2000, at 11, 13 (arguing that strategic alliances preserve the advantages of the small 
business and leverage these with the marketing resources of a large enterprise). 
25 Charles T.C. Compton, Cooperation, Collaboration, and Coalition: A Perspective on 
the Types and Purposes ofTechnology Joint Ventures, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 861, 869 (1993). 
26 !d. (quoting Prof. James Brian Quinn of Dartmouth College). 
27 See Svetlana Mosin, Riding the Merger Wave: Strategic Alliances in the Airline Indus-
try, 27 'TRANSP. L. J. 271, 272 (2000) (discussing the reasons why competitor airline industry 
players opt to enter into strategic alliances). 
28 ld. 
29 See V. Scott Killingworth, Strategic Licensing: Leveraging Technology Through Alli-
ances, CYBERSPACE LAW, Sept. 1998, at 13 (discussing the key legal and conceptual tools 
available in the licensing context). 
30 /d. 
3! See Compton, supra note 25, at871-77. 
32 /d. at 869; see also Brodley, supra note 6, at 1528-29 ("(J]oint ventures can effect 
economies of scale in research not achievable through single-firm action. Because of these 
advantages, joint ventures are especially likely to provide an optimal enterprise form in under-
takings involving high risks, technological innovations, or high information costs."). 
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E. Synergy Test 
Finally, as commentators point out, a joint venture often paves 
the way to a merger between its parent companies.33 As such, the 
joint venture arrangement may serve to test the compatibility of 
the parent companies before a full-blown merger is pursued. 
II. Two THEMES OF INTEREST 
As previously mentioned, there have been a substantial num-
ber of articles written about strategic alliances. Virtually the entire 
body of existing literature on the topic addresses the practical side 
of implementing a successful strategic alliance. There are, how-
ever, two aspects discussed in the prior literature that merit discus-
sion for purposes of this Article: (1) flexibility versus thorough 
contracting in the context of joint venture agreements; and (2) spe-
cial fiduciary duties that arise in the context of joint ventures. 
A. Flexibility or Thorough Contracting 
As mentioned previously, joint ventures have been understood 
as creatures of contract. As such, numerous authors writing on the 
topic, most notably Stephen Glover, Zenichi Shishido, and Steven 
Salbu and Richard Brahm, point to the fact that by resorting to the 
joint venture form, the venturing parties are able to consider poten-
tial problems in advance and to resolve them ex ante via contract 
negotiations.34 The partisans of ex ante problem-solving strategies 
argue that risk minimization, one of the beneficial consequences 
the joint venture form promises, requires that potential uncertain-
ties be muted in advance as much as practically possible. The ar-
gument certainly makes sense - because there are no joint venture 
statutes to ease the parties' dilemmas and little common law on 
point,35 the joint venturers should attempt to deal with the un-
known and thus spell out their intentions in advance.36 
33 See Harroch, supra note 11, at 124. 
34 See, e.g., Stephen I. Glover, Joillt Ventures and Opportunity Doctrine Problems, IN-
SIGHTS, Nov. 1995, at 9-10; see also David E. Brown, Jr., Kathryn M. Cole & Joseph A. Smith, 
Jr., Strategic Alliances: Why, How, and What to Watch For, 3 N.C. BANKING INST. 57, 61 
(1999); Salbu & Brahm, supra note 19, at 286; Zenichi Shishido, Conflicts of Interest and Fidu-
ciary Duties in the Operation of a Joint Venture, 39 HASTINGS L. J. 63,90 (1987). 
35 See Adam B. Weissburg, Note, Reviewing the Lnw on Joint Ventures with an Eye To-
ward the Future, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 487 (1990) (noting the absence of such statutes, criticizing 
the common law treatment of joint ventures, and arguing that legislatures should consider enact-
ing a statute that contains provisions ensuring that the legal stance towards the joint venture 
protects the venturers' intent.). 
36 See Bradley, supra note 6, at 1527 ("[I]f [the drafters of the joint venture agreement] 
leave some of the terms open, there will be problems of opportunism (the tendency of economic 
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On the other hand, it is also well-established that one of the 
most important advantages of the joint venture form lies in its 
flexibility and its ability to adapt to unforeseen, ever-changing, 
market conditions.37 Moreover, even the partisans of the previous 
approach, such as Stephen Glover, recognize that the joint venture 
form is an atypical investment mechanism, which defies the expec-
tations commonly associated with other investment methods.38 
Writers who examine the issue warn that excessive focus on own-
ership and control may diminish the effectiveness of the venture. 39 
Contrary to popular belief, less structured and more flexible ap-
proaches to designing a joint venture and "fifty-fifty" -type ar-
rangements with regards to control and ownership are statistically 
more likely to lead to a successful venture and are consequently 
often preferred to other approaches.40 
The advocates of this latter approach, most notably George 
W. Dent, Jr., are also skeptical that the law of contracts can even 
provide an effective answer to problems that may arise in connec-
tion with strategic alliance agreements.41 Even leaving aside the 
impossibility of foreseeing the future,42 the need for flexibility, 
which is essential to the success of the joint enterprise, undermines 
attempts to "pre-resolve" matters by means of contractual ar-
rangements. Discrediting the view that ex ante contract negotia-
tions can provide the satisfactory answer, the advocates of the lat-
ter position instead suggest that we should look to "gap fillers" and 
"fiduciary duties" notions for a more viable solution.43 
agents to behave with stealth and guile) and information imbalance (the discrepancy in knowl-
edge between parties that intensifies the effects of opportunism)."). 
37 See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., Gap Fillers and Fiduciary Duties in Strategic Alliances, 
57 Bus. LAW 55, 90-91 (2001) (arguing that because strategic alliances depend heavily on trust 
and cooperation, the contractual duties and obligations of the strategic partners can only be 
vaguely traced in advance); see also Coburn, supra note 3, at 48. 
38 See Stephen I. Glover, Negotiating and Structuring Joillt Velltures: Lessons from Man-
agemellt Consultallts, M & A LAW, Feb. 1998, at 18 (arguing that lawyers' risk aversion may 
undermine joint ventures and diminish their prospects for success). 
39 See William l Schwartz, Legal Issues Raised by Strategic Alliances Involving Multi-
media, COMPUTER LAW, Nov. 1993, at 19-20. 
40 /d. (summarizing relevant statistical data contained in studies undertaken by McKinsey 
& Company and Booz-Allen & Hamilton). 
41 See Dent, supra note 37, at 77-80 (noting that contracts will be incomplete due to the 
prohibitive expense of drafting for a large number of contingencies). 
42 See Brodley, supra note 6, at 1527 ("[I]f [the drafters of a joint venture agreement] 
attempt to specify their mutual obligations exhaustively, they will encounter a bounded rational-
ity problem- that is, an inability to foresee or to anticipate all future contingencies."). 
43 The difference between the two is explained by Dent as follows: "Gap fillers and fidu-
ciary duties are similar in many ways and the line between them is not bright. Both embody 
duties not drafted by the parties but imposed by law. Fiduciary duties may be seen as a subset 
of the broader category of gap fillers. Fiduciary duties differ, though, from gap fillers that are 
merely technical .... " Dent, supra note 37, at 71. 
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It is clear that the most plausible answer to the question 
whether it makes sense to minimize risks at the cost of restraining 
the potential success of the venture lies in a balancing test. The 
process of maximizing the likelihood that a venture succeeds as a 
profitable enterprise (the businessperson's goal) while minimizing 
various risks to the parent44 (the lawyer's goal) is most likely to 
occur when the lawyers and business people fully understand each 
others' potential contribution and orchestrate the negotiating proc-
ess of the venture so their joint skills are applied at the right time. 45 
B. Fiduciary Duties in the Context of Joint Venture Relationships 
Although joint ventures provide a viable solution to investors 
who seek to maximize profits while minimizing risks, resorting to 
the joint venture form leads to complications in the area of fiduci-
ary duties. 
The rights, duties, and obligations of joint venturers depend to 
a great extent upon the terms of the contract by which they as-
sumed relationships within the joint venture. 46 Additionally, the 
default rule provides that, 
the relationship between joint venturers, like that existing be-
tween partners, is fiduciary in character and imposes upon all 
the participants the obligation of loyalty to the joint concern 
in all matters affecting the conduct of the venturer's busi-
ness.47 
Thus, the founding members of a joint venture owe each other 
and the common alliance fiduciary duties, which in tum divide into 
duties of care and duties of loyalty.48 
The traditional analysis of fiduciary duties is more complex in 
the context of joint ventures. After a collaborative enterprise is 
44 For a discussion of risks that arise in the context of joint ventures see William P. 
O'Neil, Advanced issues in Strategic Alliances, in STRUCTURING, NEGOTIATING & IMPLEMENT-
ING STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 2000 351 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series 
No. B-1193, 2000). 
45 David Ernst & Stephen I. Glover, Strategic Alliances: Combining Legal and Business 
Best Practices to Create Successful Strategic Alliances, INSIGHTS, Oct. 1997, at 6, 6. 
46 46 AM. JUR 2D Joint Ventures§ 18 (1994). 
47 46 AM. JUR 2DJoint Ventures§ 33 (1994). 
48 See Brown, Cole & Smith, Jr., supra note 34, at 92-93. The "duty of care" is defined in 
Section 4.01(a) of the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance as "a duty 
to the corporation to perform the director's or officer's functions in good faith, in a manner that 
he or she reasonably believes to be in the best interest of the corporation, and with the care that 
an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position and 
under similar circumstances." The "duty of loyalty" is the nebulous imperative that, as fiduciar-
ies of the corporation, directors or officers may not usurp opportunities which belong to the 
corporation. 
2003] STRATEGIC ALLIANCES & CORPORATE CONTROL 875 
formed, a tripartite structure of fiduciary duties is instituted.49 The 
interlocking directors and officers owe fiduciary duties to their 
sponsor, to the alliance, and, arguably, to their sponsor's new busi-
ness partner.50 The most complex issues concern the duty of 
loyalty owed by the members to each other and to the joint ven-
ture, respectively .51 The difficulty is exacerbated because inves-
tors in many alliances are actual or potential competitors of the 
enterprise in which they invest and because such investors often 
participate in different alliances that may be competitive with each 
other. 52 To complicate issues further, and as Part III of this Article 
demonstrates, changes in the ownership or changes in the business 
strategies of the parent companies are likely to occur while the 
joint venture agreement is in existence.53 Those changes not only 
impact the future of the venture, but also further complicate the 
task of the venture's directors who are torn between following the 
interest of their sponsor and those of the alliance. 
Joint venture arrangements thus lead to a paradigmatic em-
bodiment of the representative director's dilemma54 and illustrate 
49 See Bradley, supra note 6, at 1527 (observing that the joint venture "differs from a 
merger, because it typically involves the creation of a separate, limited-purpose firm, not a 
union of two previously existing firms. Thus, the joint venture constitutes a functionally distinct 
organizational form, and its advantages and other characteristics can be understood only by 
keeping that distinction clearly in mind."); see also id. at 1529 ("There are, however, disadvan-
tages in forming a joint venture. Compared with a single firm, the joint venture is a cumber-
some organization. Control is divided, creating a problem of 'two masters."'). 
50 See Shishido, supra note 34. Whether the parent companies are each other's fiduciaries 
would seem to depend on the terms of the joint venture agreement. If, by virtue of the agree-
ment, there is a significant shift in ownership rights, such as when for instance confidential 
information is disclosed as a result thereof, a fiduciary relationship may be created. See also D. 
Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 V AND. L. REv. 1399, 1476-
77 (2002) ("As with confidential relationships, determining whether alliances are fiduciary 
relationships is extremely fact-intensive, but the key facts still relate to allocation of ownership 
rights .... The critical resource in this instance is confidential information, and the success or 
failure of Tellabs' fiduciary duty claims should tum on whether it can convince a court that the 
information in question is really 'confidential.' Without confidential information, Tellabs 
would seem to have no viable fiduciary duty claim, as Riverstone appears to have used its own 
assets to manufacture the products."). 
51 See Smith, supra note 50, at 1476-77 (noting the fact-intensive process of determining 
fiduciary relationships); see also Terence Woolf, Note, The Vemure Capitalist's Corporate 
Opportunity Problem, 2001 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 473 (2001) (discussing the duty of loyalty 
and the various tests developed by the court to explain what obligations must be fulfilled). 
52 See Schwartz, supra note 39, at 23 (observing that strategic alliances relating to multi-
media often involve partners that are competitors); see also Woolf, supra note 51, at 474 (ob-
serving that venture capitalists may owe loyalties to competing businesses). 
53 See Bradley, supra note 6, at 1529 ("[E]ven when a negotiated balance is achieved, it 
can be upset by changes in corporate goals, personnel, or parent control."). 
54 Cyril Moscow, Corporate Governance: The Representative Director Problem, IN-
SIGHTS, June 2002, at 12, 12 (outlining the representative director's dilemna of dividing loyalties 
between the shareholders and sponsor). 
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the vexing "difficulties of double-parenting."55 The case law and 
statutory authority on point fail to ease these tensions. 
In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,56 the Supreme Court of Delaware 
addressed the problem of the interested director. In reviewing a 
cash-out merger between a parent company and its subsidiary, the 
court wrote that "there is no dilution of this obligation [utmost 
good faith and inherent fairness] where one holds dual or multiple 
directorships, as in a parent-subsidiary context."57 Along the same 
lines, statutory provisions impose equal fiduciary duties of good 
management owed by interlocking directors or officers to both 
special purpose vehicles and their sponsors.58 
As Cyril Moscow has pointed out, the dilemma of the repre-
sentative director is not often considered.59 Authors who have ad-
dressed the issue in the context of the duty of loyalty, while em-
phasizing the need for proper disclosure of directors' conflicts of 
interest,60 urge that the tests usu::tlly employed by courts to deter-
mine whether an usurpation of corporate opportunity has occurred 
(the line of business test,61 the fairness test,62 the expectancy test,63 
55 Steven R. Salbu & Richard A. Brahm, Strategic Considerations in Designing Joint 
Ve/lture Contracts, 1992 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 253,291 (1992). 
56 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
57 /d. at710. 
58 See James G. Leyden, Jr., A Key State's Approach to LLC's: Delaware Can Be Differ-
ent, Bus. L. TODAY, May-June 2000, at 51, 59 (discussing at length the Delaware Limited Li-
ability Company Act, 6 Del. C. §§ 18-101, et seq., and noting that, under prevailing law, if a 
manager or a representative of a member also serves on the board of another entity, such as a 
Delaware corporation that is a member of the DLLC, such manager or representative of a mem-
ber will likely owe an equal fiduciary duty of good management to the DLLC and the member). 
59 Moscow, supra note 54, at 12. 
60 See Glover, supra note 38. 
61 The "line of business" test was announced in the landmark case of Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 
A.2d 503 (Del. 1939), as follows: 
/d. at 511. 
if there is presented to a corporate officer or director a business opportu-
nity which the corporation is fmancially able to undertake, is, from its 
nature, in the line of the corporation's business and is of practical advan-
tage to it, is one in which the corporation has an interest or a reasonable 
expectancy, and, by embracing the opportunity, the self-interest of the 
officer or director will be brought into conflict with that of his corpora-
tion, the law will not permit him to seize the corporate opportunity for 
himself. 
62 The "fairness" test was articulated by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 
Dwfee v. Durfee & Canning, Inc., 80 N.E.2d 522 (Mass. 1948), as follows: the "true basis of 
the governing doctrine rests fundamentally on the unfairness in the particular circumstances of a 
director, whose relation to the corporation is fiduciary, 'taking advantage of an opportunity [for 
his personal profit] when the interest of the corporation justly call[s] for protection."' /d. at 529. 
63 The "expectancy" test, articulated by the Alabama courts in Lagarde v. Anniston Lime 
& Stone Co., 126 Ala. 496 (1899), would look to whether the director or officer usurped a cor-
porate opportunity in which "the corporation has an interest already existing or in which it has 
an expectancy growing out of an existing right." /d. at 502. 
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or the American Law Institute's guidelines64) are not adequate for 
application to the joint venture context. The common law tests 
and the ALI principles do not offer sufficient guidance to a direc-
tor or officer who holds multiple fiduciary obligations.65 The al-
ternative would be to either narrowly define the concept of corpo-
rate opportunity in the instruments that govern the alliance or to 
contractually disclaim that loyalty duties attach.66 However, while 
the former alternative seems more or less illusory given the practi-
cal impossibility of drafting in anticipation of the unforeseen, 67 the 
latter seems to undermine the very foundation of the joint venture 
relationship, namely the existence of a relationship of trust. 68 
Other commentators, most persuasively Cyril Moscow, call 
for an abandonment of corporate law rhetoric altogether. While 
recognizing that in an ideal world interested directors should at-
tempt to fairly pursue the interests of all shareholders, these com-
mentators argue that in the real world representative directors 
should be allowed to maximize the interests of their sponsor to 
some extent, as they are expected to do. 69 These "skeptics" recog-
nize that there exists an insurmountable gap between the academic 
discourse of corporate law, which holds representative directors to 
the same standards of care and loyalty as independent directors, 
and reality.70 Questioning whether cases like Weinberger are any-
thing more than attempts to create an artificial, unrealistic, and 
ideal corporate model of director independence, they suggest a dif-
ferent approach that recognizes the representative directors' di-
lemma, allows contractual disclaimers of duties to a certain degree, 
limits the directors' ability to unabashedly pursue sponsor interest, 
but allows them to share information with their sponsor.71 
III. A JOINT VENTURE AT WoRK 
The recently dissolved strategic alliance known as Time War-
ner Entertainment ("TWE") is a paradigmatic illustration of the 
complexities that surround joint venture agreements. TWE, a 
"wickedly confusing joint venture,"72 was created in 1991, when 
Time Warner sold 12.5% of its movie and cable holdings to two 
64 See ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance§§ 5.05, 5.06 (1992). 
65 See Woolf, supra note 51, at 473. 
66 I d. at 498. 
67 See supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text. 
6B See Dent, supra note 37, at 66-69. 
69 See Moscow, supra note 54, at 18. 
70 ld. 
71 ld. 
72 Marc Gunter & Stephanie N. Mehta, The Mess At AOL Time Warner: Can Steve Case 
Make Sense ofThis Beast?, FORTUNE, May 2002, at 74. 
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Japanese corporate giants, Toshiba Corp. and Itoh Cho Co., in ex-
change for $1 billion.73 In 1993, TWE raised another $2.5 billion 
when US West, Inc., purchased a 25% interest in the partnership.74 
At the time, telephone and cable companies were competing and 
searching for ways to provide a "new generation of telecommuni-
cations services in the home, including video phone calling, mov-
ies on demand, interactive shopping services and hundreds of TV 
channels."75 US West's investment in the TWE partnership and its 
joint venture agreement with Time Warner were perceived to bene-
fit both companies as a way to finance the implementation of the 
then novel "information superhighway. "76 Other participants in 
the telecommunications industry recognized the groundbreaking 
nature of the deal, commenting that "over the next couple of dec-
ades, you're going to see a lot of joining together of cable and 
telco industries."77 
The first discord between US West and Time Warner occurred 
in 1995. Earlier that year, US West acquired MediaOne. Follow-
ing the acquisition, US West created Media Group to control its 
stake in TWE.78 In the fall of 1995, Time Warner revealed plans 
to acquire Turner Broadcasting Systems Inc. 79 US West an-
nounced that it disagreed with Time Warner's plans, arguing that 
Time Warner, the general partner of TWE, breached its fiduciary 
duty owed to the limited partners of TWE because the acquisition 
would usurp a business opportunity of the partnership. Specifi-
cally, US West alleged that Time Warner's intended acquisition of 
Turner would violate a non-compete agreement signed by TWE's 
partners: Turner owned several cable networks which, if the acqui-
sition were completed, would compete with the partnership's 
Home Box Office (HBO) network; further, Turner's movie studios 
were likely to compete with the Warner Brothers movie studios 
controlled by TWE. 80 US West's suit, seeking to block the merger, 
was filed minutes after the merger agreement had been signed by 
Turner and Time :Warner, in March of 1996.81 Despite its dis-
73 See Paul Farhi, Phone Firm Buying 25% Stake in Time Warner Entertainmellt, WASH. 
POST, May 17, 1993, at Al. 
74 ld. 
75 ld. 
76 ld. 
77 New Slant On Old Arguments: US West Teams Up With Time Warner in 'Landmark' 
Move For Telcos, COMM. DAILY, May 18, 1993, at 2. 
78 Kelly Carroll, Last Call For Residential DSL?, TELEPHONY, Jan. 2000, available at 
LEXIS, News Group File, AIL 
79 US West Files Suit to Halt Time Warner-Turner Merger, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Sept. 22, 
1995, available at LEXIS, News Group File, AIL 
80 ld. 
81 Carroll, supra note 78. 
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agreement with Time Warner's acquisition, US West did not ap-
peal the decision granting dismissal of the suit, which followed in 
June later that year. 82 
In June of 1998, US West spun off its Media Group. The spin 
off led to the creation of a new entity, Media One Group, designed 
to control the 25% stake in the TWE partnership.83 In April of the 
following year, AT&T announced that it was pursuing a $58 bil-
lion purchase of MediaOne Group.84 AT&T's proposed acquisi-
tion of MediaOne was perceived to "strengthen AT&T's position 
as the nation's leading cable provider and enhance the company's 
ability to bundle voice, video, and Internet communications ser-
vices to its customers."85 Further, market analysts speculated that 
the acquisition would benefit AT&T in the long run since Me-
dia One's stake in TWE was thought to be "an obstacle in the com-
pletion of a joint venture telephony relationship between AT&T 
and Time Warner. "86 
On January 10, 2000, Time Warner announced new plans of 
its own, agreeing to merge with America Online Inc. ("AOL") in a 
$162 billion stock transaction.87 The merger purported to "launch 
the next Internet revolution."88 It also marked a victory for Amer-
ica Online, a company that "had been fighting to gain access to the 
high-speed Internet systems provided through cable companies."89 
In that respect, the merger was a defeat for AT&T and brought to a 
halt the possibility of a substantial cooperation between AT&T and 
Time Warner. 
Following the announcement of the AOL-Time Warner 
merger, AT&T signaled its desire to dissolve the TWE partnership. 
Both AOL Time Warner and AT&T feared that the intricacy of 
their relationship, and their very different visions of the future, 
unduly confused investors. 9° Furthermore, following the news that 
AT&T was selling its cable-TV business to a Time Warner com-
82 ld. 
83 Jd. 
84 Jd. 
85 AT&T, Subsidiaries Affirmed by Fitch IBCA Following Bid for MediaOne, PR NEWS-
WlRE, Apr. 23, 1999, available at LEXIS, News Group File, All. 
86 ld. 
87 See, e.g., Tim Jones, Deal Transforms Media Landscape: $162 Billion Marriage Joins 
internet, Cable and Content, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Jan. 11, 2000, at I. 
88 I d. (citing Steve Case, the founder and clrief executive of America Online). 
89 Jd.; see also Joshua Cho, AT&T Seeks to Dissolve Most Ns Thru Swaps, CABLE 
WORLD, June 1999, at 8, available at LEXIS, News Group File, All (reporting America 
Online's unsuccessful lobbying for access to AT&T' s broadband networks). 
90 See Lisa Levenson, AT&T, AOL Time Warner Hire Bank of America to Appraise Ven-
ture, BLOOMBERG NEWS, July 2, 2002, available at LEXIS, New Group File, All. 
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petitor, Comcast Corp.,91 the purpose of AT&T's investment in the 
partnership became unclear. 
Pursuant to the terms of the TWE joint venture agreement, the 
venturers possessed registration rights. After its acquisition of 
MediaOne Group, AT&T inherited US West's right to cause a 
public offering of TWE stock.92 Alternatively, under the agree-
ment, AT&T could require that AOL Time Warner buy as much of 
its stake as the public would, pursuant to an opinion provided by 
an investment banker.93 Estimates valued AT&T's stake in TWE 
at somewhere between $7.5 and $10 billion.94 After failed at-
tempts to agree on a fair price, AT&T commenced the process of 
turning the venture into a publicly traded entity.95 
Because AOL Time Warner disfavored the idea of an IPO, in-
tense negotiation yielded a different solution: AT&T received 
about $2 billion in cash, about $1.5 billion in AOL Time W amer 
stock, and approximately a 20% stake in a newly formed entity, 
Time Warner Cable.96 Comcast, Time Warner's competitor and 
the acquirer of AT&T's cable-TV operations, inherited the 20% 
stake in Time W amer Cable and an option of later selling it as part 
of an initial public offering.97 
Hence, after almost a decade since US West purchased its 
stake in the partnership, the TWE venture was finally dissolved. 
Its history illustrates the several assumptions that stand underneath 
the arguments raised in the pages that follow: 
e Joint venture agreements serve as means by which the 
venturers attempt to exploit synergistic factors with an expec-
tation of profit. In TWE's case, the alliance was between the 
telecommunications and the cable provider industries. 98 
• By entering strategic alliances, parent companies essen-
tially make predictions about the future and resort to the joint 
venture form to share the inherent risk. Here the prediction 
was that the telecom-cable alliance would be fruitful in the 
91 ld. 
92 See Seth Schiesel & Andrew Ross Sorkin, AT&T Asks $1 Billion of AOL Time Warner, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2002, at C2. 
93 See id. 
94 See Seth Schiesel, AT&T and AOL Are Said to Seek Delay in Evaluation of Joint Ellter-
tainment Unit, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2002, at C3. 
95 See Seth Schiesel, AT&T, Writing Down Cable Assets, Post Big Loss, N.Y. TIMES, July 
24, 2002, at C4. 
96 Seth Schiesel, AOL Time Warner Near Deal on a Unit, Again, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 
2002, atC4. 
97 See id. 
98 See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text. 
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future.99 The prediction was correct since, over the course of 
nearly a decade, US West's $2.5 billion investment matured 
into a stake reportedly worth fourfold. 100 
• During the life of an alliance the parties to the venture 
may undertake various metamorphoses. They may acquire 
entities that threaten to compete with the venture, like Time 
Warner who acquired Turner Broadcasting Systems. They 
may be acquired by entities that try to pursue more compre-
hensive alliances with the other venturer(s), like MediaOne 
who was acquired by AT&T. 
• During the life of the venture, its success notwithstand-
ing, the parties' respective visions of the future may change. 
In TWE's case, for instance, following AT&T's acquisition 
of Media One, instead of opting to pursue a more comprehen-
sive venture with the telecom giant, Time Warner chose to 
pursue a merger with America Online, hoping that such an al-
liance would launch "the new Internet revolution." 101 
881 
IV. THE DESIRABILITY OF AN EQUITY INVESTMENT ARRANGEMENT 
TO SUPPLEMENT THE JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT 
When should a venturer bargain for an equity stake in its po-
tential ally? When should both venturers resort to cross-equity 
investments? The following section commences by exploring 
ways in which such arrangements might be beneficial to the com-
mon alliance; it then suggests a non-exhaustive list of factors that 
should be considered before a decision to pursue these investments 
is made. 
Joint venture agreements are pursued in part because of their 
ability to minimize risk. 102 Even so, risks are not always evenly 
distributed between the venturers. Often, in a strategic alliance, 
one of the venturers (VI) possesses the capital, while the other 
venturer (V2) possesses, as sole assets, a research plan or certain 
know-how. 103 In those circumstances a joint product alliance be-
tween the two entities would spread the risk unevenly between VI 
and V2, and the two partners' respective commitments to the joint 
99 See id. 
Joo See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
101 See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text. 
'
02 See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text. 
103 See Dent, supra note 5, at 73 ("[I)n some research and development alliances one party 
does most of the research while the other (usually the larger firm and a potential user of the 
product to be developed) provides financing."). 
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effort might differ. To counterbalance these considerations, it 
would make sense for V2 to try to acquire an equity stake in Vl. 
By agreeing to issue common stock for V2's benefit, Vl would 
most likely convince it of its commitment to the joint effort, to 
their common financial future, and to the fairness of the transac-
tion.104 Similarly, if Vl believes in the success of the alliance, it 
will most likely wish to bargain for an equity stake in V2. Such a 
stake would entitle it to share in V2' s future successes and allow it 
to have a say in how that future should be fashioned. 
In addition to binding the parties' interests and to ensuring 
their sustained commitment to the venture, these investments can 
answer more fundamental concerns. Cross-equity investments can 
minimize corporate opportunity problems likely to occur in the 
context of the joint venture: if V 1 decides to pursue a corporate 
opportunity that arguably belongs to the venture, then V2 would 
still share in the rewards. This might minimize the chances of 
V2's disagreeing with Vl 's decision. In cross-equity joint ven-
tures, the vexing fiduciary duty analyses are simplified, and the 
efficient result may be more likely to prevail. 105 
Furthermore, acquiring an equity stake allows a venturer to 
protect itself from leakages of indirect value. In other words, by 
asking V 1 to obtain an equity stake in V2, V2 can protect itself 
from the eventuality that Vl might "appropriate know-how be-
longing to the other party or developed by the two parties 
jointly."106 
That appropriation of know-how could occur inadvertently, as 
there often is mobility among employees of the joint venture and 
104 I d. at 63 ("An alliance needs trust and cooperation; it will not thrive if even one side 
judges the deal unfair. People who feel abused often retaliate, even if they know that retaliation 
is costly. In a bad contract both sides may withhold their best efforts. The stronger party should 
seek fair terms, explain its proposals, and listen to its partner."). 
105 Although, as previously stated, the antitrust concerns raised by cross-equity joint ven-
tures are outside the ambit of this Article, it would seem that cross-equity investments - if in-
deed they allow for the efficient mechanisms of competition to impact the venturers' decision-
making- would not raise significant antitrust policy issues. See Werden, supra note 6, at 704 
("[A]ntitrust analysis of joint ventures depends a great deal on how the venture affects the inde-
pendent decision making of its participants and which competitive strategies are affected."). 
106 Dent, supra note 5, at 69. The leakage of indirect value could have been a reason why, 
as part of a joint venture agreement signed by DuPont and Pioneer Hi-Bred, DuPont agreed to 
purchase an equity stake in Pioneer Hi-Bred. DuPont "bought a 20 percent stake in Pioneer in 
1997, giving DuPont access to Pioneer's knowledge of seed development." Michael Lovell, The 
Cost of Consolidation, Is Des Moines on the Wrong End of M & A?, DES MolNES BUSINESS 
RECORD, Oct. 14, 2002, available at 2002 WL 13800637. In 1997, the two companies "began a 
joint research project called Optimum Quality Grains LLC, which worked to produce new varie-
ties of com and soybeans. Promising progress through the joint venture led DuPont to announce 
in March 1999 that it would pay $7.7 billion for the 80 percent of Pioneer it didn't already 
own." ld. Mr. Fraidin advised Pioneer Hi-Bred in connection with the 1997 joint venture and 
again in connection with the 1999 acquisition. 
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the parties to the venture. While an equity stake does not provide 
precise protection against leakage, it can provide a level of practi-
cal fairness. 
Professor Brodley noted in 1982 that "if [joint venturers] 
leave some terms open, there will be problems of opportunism ... 
and information imbalance."107 The converse of Professor's Brod-
ley 's argument is that by alleviating the tensions between the joint 
venturers, by reducing the incentives for opportunism, and by eve-
ning out the information imbalance, cross-equity investments al-
low for more flexibility in the joint venture agreement. As previ-
ously discussed, it seems that the success of the venture is tied to 
the degree of flexibility allowed for by the partnership agree-
ment.108 Equity investments, whether unilateral or bilateral, under-
taken in connection with a joint venture agreement would thus 
seem to foster flexibility in their agreement. 
Finally, as previously suggested, given that strategic alliances 
often occur in concentrated markets where repeat players battle 
each other for the same audience, the existence of an equity in-
vestment agreement between the joint venturers could minimize 
the possibility that the assets of the venturers, or those of the joint 
venture, would fall in the hands of a competitor. For instance, the 
presence of such an investment in TWE' s case might have made 
the Time Warner- Comcast alliance less likely .109 
To be sure, equity investments undertaken in connection with 
a joint venture agreement are not always desirable. However, 
there are instances where they can substantially contribute to the 
success of the venture. To summarize, attention should be gener-
ally paid to the following factors: 
• The degree of risk posed by the alliance: Are risks dis-
tributed evenly? 
• The nature of the venturers: Is this the type of alliance 
that might be conducive to an equity arrangement? 
107 Bradley, supra note 6, at 1527. 
1os See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. 
109 See supra text accompanying notes 91-97. However, for the same reasons, the exis-
tence of an equity investment agreement between VI and V2 might be deemed a defensive 
maneuver under Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). To prevent 
the venturers' decision from judicial second-guessing, compliance with the factors set forth by 
the Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal and decisions that follow that case is required. See infra 
discussion accompanying footnotes 134-39. 
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• The potential that the parties' respective visions of the 
future might change: Are the venturers engaged in the type of 
industry where staying ahead of the competition is essential? 
• The level of trust otherwise existent between the ven-
turers: Can the venturers establish sufficient trust absent an 
equity arrangement? 
• The level of flexibility otherwise achievable in the joint 
venture agreement: Can the joint venturers allow for suffi-
cient flexibility in their agreement absent an equity arrange-
ment? 
• The potential for leakage of indirect value: Does one of 
the venturers possess a certain unique know-how? 
• The degree to which the venturers wish to bind their re-
spective financial futures: Do the venturers believe that the 
alliance is a "synergy test"? 110 
• The nature of the market where the alliance takes place 
and the degree of likelihood that a competitor would attempt 
to acquire the assets of the venture or of one of its parents: 
Do the venturers believe that an investment arrangement 
might help avoid those results? 
V. THE IMPACT OF EQUITY POSffiONS ON THE CONTROL OF THE 
PARTNERS 
In this section we assume that the venturers are seriously con-
sidering an equity investment arrangement, whether unilaterally or 
bilaterally, to supplement their joint venture agreement. Put into 
practice, such investments raise concerns from the perspective of 
both the investee and the investing company. Some of the more 
significant of these concerns are discussed below. The discussion 
is broken into two sections: (1) Corporate governance and future 
operations issues; and (2) Fiduciary duty issues. 
11o See supra text accompanying note 33. 
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A. The Impact of Equity Investments on Corporate Governance 
Issues and on Future Operations 
1. Issues for the Investee 
• Governance: Equity arrangements can impact the in-
vestee company's internal management and control. Obvi-
ously, the larger the equity stake involved, the larger the de-
gree of control the investing party would wield over the in-
ternal operations of the investee company. Consequently, the 
investee company will likely be concerned about its contin-
ued autonomy. 
• Acquisition: By some estimates, up to 75% of joint 
ventures ultimately conclude with one party acquiring the 
other. Ill Since joint ventures are often a prelude to acquisi-
tion, the investee may wish to prevent the investing party 
from seeking to attempt a future purchase without the ap-
proval of the investment board. This can be particularly true 
in the case of joint ventures with an equity investment com-
ponent since the investing party will have certain advantages 
over potential third-party acquirers in light of its equity posi-
tion (i.e. lower average cost). 
2. Issues for the Investor 
• Equity accounting: In joint ventures with a substantial 
equity investment component, the investing party may be re-
quired to use the "equity method" of accounting (the "equity 
method"). The equity method would require the investor to 
report its share of the in vestee's earnings as incurred, rather 
than as received in the form of dividends. 
In Opinion No. 18, entitled The Equity Method of Accounting 
for Investments in Common Stock, the Accounting Principles 
Board (APB) concluded that Generally Accepted Accounting Prin-
ciples (GAAP) require an investor to use the equity method when 
the investor's equity stake permits the company to "exercise sig-
nificant influence over operating and financial policies of an inves-
111 Joel Bleeke & David Ernst, The Way to Win in Cross-Border Alliances, in COLLABO-
RATING TO COMPETE 29 (Joel Bleeke & David Ernst eds., 1993). 
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tee even though the investor holds 50% or less of the voting 
stock." 112 
APB Opinion No. 18 highlights several factors which would 
amount to "significant influence," including representation on the 
investee's board of directors, participation in its policy-making 
process, material intercompany transactions, and the interchange 
of managerial personnel or technological dependency. 
Furthermore, the ability to exercise "significant influence" is 
presumed to exist in investments of 20% or more and is presumed 
not to exist for investments of less than 20%. m 
If a joint venture agreement affords the investor an equity in-
vestment component greater than a 20% interest in the investee, 
the presumption that the investor would exercise "significant in-
fluence" (thus, triggering the application of equity accounting 
principles) can be overcome only by "facts and circumstances" 
which indicate the contrary, including evidence that the investor 
and investee entered into an agreement under which the investor 
surrendered significant rights as a shareholder. 114 
• Control: The investing company may wish to restrict 
the ability of the investee to sell a substantial equity stake to 
a third party or, particularly, a competitor. At the least, the 
investing party may wish to retain the ability to withdraw its 
investment in the event of a change in control of the in vestee. 
• Ability to compete for control: The investing party 
may also want to retain the ability to compete for control of 
the in vestee if the in vestee were to decide in the future to sell. 
• Commitment of resources: Finally, the investing party 
may not want to tie up scarce economic resources in the other 
party for a prolonged period of time. 
In joint venture transactions with an equity component, the 
parties will often address these concerns through an investment 
agreement of one form of another. Investment agreements often 
contain one or more of the following provisions: 
112 The Equity Method of Accounting for Investments in Common Stock, lO Opinions of 
the Accounting Principles Board 347, 355 (1971). 
113 See id. 
114 See FiNANCIAL ACCOUNT£NG STANDARDS BOARD, FASB INTERPRETATION No. 35 
[CRITERIA FOR APPLYING THE EQUITY METHOD OF ACCOUNT£NG FOR INVESTMENTS £N COM-
MON STOCK: AN INTERPRETATION OF APB 0P£NION No. 18]1 (1981). 
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• Governance provisions that place restrictions on vot-
ing rights and/or nomination of board members. On the other 
hand, the investing party may require certain concessions, in-
cluding veto rights; 
• A registration rights agreement between the parties; 
• A standstill restriction which prevents the investing 
party from: (1) purchasing an additional equity stake in the 
investee company; (2) proposing or seeking to effect a 
merger, acquisition, or similar transaction of the investee 
company, announcing an intention to do so, or assisting a 
third party in doing so; or (3) soliciting proxies, making 
shareholder proposals, or entering into voting trusts. The in-
vesting party may require that these standstill restrictions be 
lifted in the event of a proposed merger or acquisition initi-
ated by the investee company or by a third party, or any 
change of control event; and 
• A restriction on the investing party's ability to dispose 
of its equity stake for a period of time, while allowing the in-
vesting party to sell in the event of a change of control or 
other triggering event. 
3. Length ofTime 
887 
Time limits on governance limitations and standstill arrange-
ments are often an important subject of negotiations between par-
ties to an equity investment agreement. Research indicates that 
such restrictions can range in length from a few years to perpetu-
ity .115 One important factor in negotiating the expiration of these 
restrictions is the duration of the joint venture. What are the im-
plications on the investee if the restrictions lapse while the joint 
venture continues? Conversely, what are the justifications, if any, 
for the restrictions to continue after the joint venture has termi-
nated? 
Take, for example, Borden, Inc.'s $360 million, 39% equity 
investment in AEP Industries undertaken in connection with the 
115 Meryl S. Rosenblatt, Letters of Intent and Exclusivity, Confidentiality and Standstill 
Agreements, in DRAFTING CORPORATE AGREEMENTS 95, 120, 1349 (Practicing Law lnstitute 
2002) ("Standstills entered into in the context of a friendly negotiated acquisition transaction can 
tYPically last from 1 to 5 years."). 
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sale of its packaging business to AEP. 116 The parties' agreement 
restricted Borden's ability to purchase additional securities absent 
a sale of AEP's entire voting interest to a third party. The standstill 
agreement between AEP and Borden had a length of three years 
unless AEP reduced its ownership stake to 0%. In addition, the 
agreement between Borden and AEP called for Borden to desig-
nate four of the ten directors on the AEP board, with a fifth direc-
tor to be designated jointly by the two companies. 117 
On the other end of the spectrum, consider the 23.4% equity 
stake in Martin Marietta Corporation received by General Electric 
Company in 1993 as part of Martin Marietta's acquisition of GE 
Aerospace. " 8 The companies negotiated an agreement whereby 
GE acquired two seats on the Martin Marietta board. The agree-
ment prohibits GE from acquiring any additional stock and re-
quires GE to vote its stock in Martin Marietta according to the 
wishes of the Martin Marietta board slate or, in limited circum-
stances, in proportion with other shareholders. The agreement be-
tween GE and Martin Marietta lasts in perpetuity, unless and until 
GE were to reduce its ownership stake to less than 5%. 
4. Impact on Future Operations 
Joint venture arrangements, especially where they contain an 
equity investment, have the potential to substantially affect the 
future business options of one or both parties. 
Joint venture agreements have the potential to deter future 
bidders for the investee company in several ways:"9 
116 In 1996, Borden, Inc. sold its packaging unit for approximately $360 million in cash 
and stock to AEP Industries. See Ron Carter, Borden Selling Packaging Unit for $360 Million, 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June 21, 1996, at 1C. 
117 ld. 
118 Martin Marietta acquired GE Aerospace in 1993 in a deal worth $3.05 billion. In ex-
change for GE Aerospace, GE received approximately $2 billion in cash and receivables and the 
remainder in preferred convertible stock. See Judith Gaines, Pittsfield Peers Beyond GE Em-
brace, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 6, 1992, at 1. Martin Marietta Corporation is now Lockheed Mar-
tin. 
119 For an interesting example of an agreement whose effect is to deter future bidders, see 
Peter Landers, Merck Sacrificed Right to Make Buyout Offer to Schering-Plough, WALL ST. J., 
Oc., 22, 2002, at B3. In May of 2000, Merck and Schering-Plough created a joint venture to 
cooperate in developing and marketing a new anti-cholesterol drug called Zetia. The parties 
expected that, if successful, Zelia would create sales that ranged in the billions. In connection 
with the joint venture agreement, Merck & Co. has given up the right to make a buyout offer for 
Schering-Plough unless specifically requested in writing by Schering-Plough 's board of direc-
tors. If, however, Schering-Plough's board entertains offers from a third company, Merck has 
the right to make an offer of its own. Furthermore, Merck can take full control of Schering-
Plough's half of the Zetia joint venture if a third company buys Schering-Plough. This last 
provision seems to significantly reduce the chance that any third company would make a buyout 
offer. 
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• First, a bidder might have a difficult time vaJuing the 
"open-ended" nature of the joint venture relationship. 
e AdditionaJly, a bidder's vaJuation of a venturing party 
could vary significantly depending upon whether its partner 
would be willing to continue venture operations and/or or ex-
ercise its "exit" rights. 
• If the venture arrangement contains a significant cross 
equity component, the investor's equity stake would give it a 
financial advantage over other bidders for the investee (i.e. 
lower average cost). Bidders might be unwilling to act as a 
"stalking horse" for the investing company with no upside 
potential. 
• In another variation of the "stalking horse" theme, some 
joint venture investment agreements give the investing party 
"notice" and "full and fair opportunity to bid" rights. 
• FinaJly, the joint venture could give one of the ventur-
ers actual or perceived informationaJ advantages over other 
bidders. This is particularly true if, as is often the case, the 
investor has representatives on the board of the investee. 
889 
In addition, joint venture agreements can provide one or both 
companies with a potential defensive response to a future unsolic-
ited bid. To the extent that the discounted future value of the joint 
venture could not be realized because the other party to the joint 
venture has favorable buy-out rights if there is a change of control, 
the board could determine that a bid is inadequate and that it is in 
the best interests of the Company to remain independent since, ab-
sent a change of control, the value of the company would be 
greater. Moreover, these arrangements can deprive shareholders of 
a fully-priced bid for their company. 
Moreover, the universe of potential buyers could be reduced 
by the "deterrent" aspects of joint venture agreements mentioned 
above. 120 
However, a joint venture can be structured so as to provide 
certain advantages in the event of a future decision to sell by pre-
serving or improving the selling company's ability to maximize 
shareholder value. For example, in a joint venture with a substan-
tial equity investment, the investing party can ensure that its stand-
120 See id. 
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still agreement would remain in effect if the investing company 
were to lose in the auction process, thus prohibiting the investing 
company from soliciting against the winning bid (sometimes called 
an "end run"). 
Finally, investment agreements often contain voting restric-
tions which require the investing company to vote its shares in fa-
vor of the investee board's slate. This could be of significant 
value in the event of a future proxy contest. 
B. The Impact of Joint Venture Agreements and Equity Investments 
on Fiduciary Obligations 
As previously discussed, a joint venture agreement can result 
in complex issues of fiduciary duties. 121 In addition, the structure 
of a joint venture arrangement, with or without a collateral equity 
investment, can have a more substantial impact on the fiduciary 
obligations of one or both of the joint venture partners if the joint 
venture agreements, taken as a whole, might be viewed as either: 
(1) a sale of control of one of the venturers; or (2) a defense 
against takeover by one of the venturers. 
I. Overview of Fiduciary Obligations 
In the performance of their corporate responsibilities, corpo-
rate directors have an obligation to exercise the care that an ordi-
narily prudent person would exercise under similar circumstances. 
This is generally called the "duty of care." 122 In addition, directors 
are bound by a "duty of loyalty," which prohibits corporate offi-
cers from using their position of trust and confidence to further 
. . t 123 pnvate mteres s. 
When reviewing whether a board of directors' approval of a 
given transaction satisfies the "duty of care" and the "duty of loy-
alty" requirements, courts will generally apply the "business 
judgment rule," a presumption that the directors of a corporation 
acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief 
that the action taken was in the best interests of the company. 124 If 
121 See supra pages 10-13 and accompanying footnotes. 
122 See, e.g., Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963) (adopting 
the "prudent man" standard in the duty of care context); see also Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace 
Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984); supra note 48. 
123 See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503,510 (Del. 1939); see also supra notes 60-62. 
124 For an early formulation of the "business judgment rule" see Bodell v. General Gas & 
Electric Corp., 140 A. 264, 268 (Del. 1927) (holding that the presumption applies where "the 
acts of the directors objected to were performed in good faith, in the exercise of their best judg-
ment, and for what they believed to be the advantage of the corporation and all its stockhold-
ers."); see also Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (holding that the 
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this presumption applies, corporate decision-makers would be 
shielded from judicial second-guessing. 
2. Sale of Control 
If a joint venture transaction (or the equity investment com-
ponent) would be viewed as a sale of fundamental control over one 
of the parties, the courts could apply a special fiduciary duty 
analysis upon the company's board of directors. According to the 
Delaware Supreme Court in Rev/on Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, Inc., if a "sale" or "break-up" of a company becomes 
"inevitable," the duty of the board of directors changes "from the 
preservation of [the corporation] as a corporate entity to the maxi-
mization of the company's value at a sale for the stockholders' 
benefit," thus requiring the board to act as "auctioneers charged 
with getting the best price for the stockholders."125 In such cir-
cumstances, the members of the board have to perform their duties 
with a single objective in mind: the maximization of shareholder 
value. 126 In order to ascertain whether board members have com-
plied with their "duty to auction," Delaware courts apply a more 
h. 0 127 searc mg scrutmy. 
Decisions since Rev/on have extended this "auction duty" be-
yond the factual context of the "sale" or "break-up." For instance, 
the Delaware Supreme Court held in Paramount Communications, 
Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. 128 that "the directors' obligation to seek 
the best value reasonably available for the stockholders" applies 
whenever there is "a pending sale of control, regardless of whether 
or not there would be a break-up of the corporation."129 Surveying 
"intrinsic fairness" test and not the business judgment rule should apply in the context of a par-
ent-subsidiary relationship). 
125 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (enjoining enforcement of an asset lock-up option, a no-
shop provision, and a beak-up fee granted to favor a favored bidder). 
126 It is important to note that Rev/on dbes not impose a new type of duty upon the board 
members, but rather requires them to perform their duties with a sole objective in mind- maxi-
mization of shareholder value. See Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1083 (Del. 2001) 
("In our view, Rev/on neither creates a new type of fiduciary duty in the sale-of-control context 
nor alters the nature of the fiduciary duties that generally apply. Rather, Rev/on emphasizes that 
the board must perform its fiduciary duties in the service of a specific objective: maximizing the 
sale price of the enterprise."); see also Paramount Comm., Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 
A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1994) ("The directors' fiduciary duties in a sale of control context are those 
which generally attach. In short, 'the directors must act in accordance with their fundamental 
duties of care and loyalty."') (citation omitted); id. at 44 ("In the sale of control context, the 
directors must focus on one primary objective - to secure the transaction offering the best value 
reasonably available for the stockholders- and they must exercise their fiduciary duties to fur-
ther that end."). 
127 Ma/piede, 780 A.2d at 1084 ("[T]he Revlon doctrine imposes enhanced judicial scru-
tiny of certain transactions involving a sale of control."). 
128 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994). 
129 /d. at 46. 
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decisions since Revlon, the court noted that "the general principles 
announced in Revlon" govern "every case in which a fundamental 
change of corporate control occurs or is contemplated," and that 
"in a sale of corporate control the responsibility of directors is to 
get the highest value reasonably attainable for the shareholders. "130 
The answer to the question of whether a given transaction 
would constitute "a fundamental change of corporate control" is a 
highly fact-specific inquiry, and "the answer must be sought in the 
specific circumstances surrounding the transaction." 131 
In holding that the transfer of a majority of stock from public 
shareholders to a controlling shareholder triggered the duty to 
maximize shareholder value under the Rev/on case, the QVC court 
found particularly significant the fact that a majority of Para-
mount's voting stock would transfer from "fluid aggregation of 
unaffiliated stockholders" to a single "controlling stockholder" 
who would have the power to (a) elect directors; (b) cause a break-
up of the corporation; (c) merge it with another company; (d) cash-
out the public stockholders; (e) amend the certificate of incorpora-
tion; (f) sell all or substantially all of the corporate assets; or (g) 
otherwise alter materially the nature of the corporation and the 
public stockholders' interests. 132 
The significance of the Rev/on case and its progeny is simply 
that joint venture arrangements, with or without an ancillary equity 
investment agreement, have the potential to trigger the "duty to 
auction" if one or more of the factors outlined in the QVC case 
would result from the transaction. In order to prevent courts from 
second-guessing a company's decision to enter into a joint venture 
with a substantial equity investment, the board of directors of the 
investee company may wish to consider negotiating a standstill 
arrangement which would do one or more of the following: 
• Place a cap on the investing party's ownership level 
and/or its ability to increase its voting power through other 
means; 
• Place voting restrictions on the investing party's equity 
share; 
• Limit the ability of the investing party to transfer its 
shares in large blocks to any single third party; or 
130 /d. 
131 /d. (citations omitted). 
132 /d. at 46-48. 
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• Limit the ability of the investing party to elect a major-
ity of the board of directors. 
893 
Since there is no "magic bullet" answer to the question of 
"what constitutes a change in control," in order to get the benefit 
of the business judgment rule, the investee company must consider 
its fiduciary obligations thoroughly. 
An effective standstilJ arrangement can eliminate many of the 
fiduciary risks associated with cross equity investments. However, 
there is still an open question as to how large an equity stake 
would be sufficient to effect a change in control even with a stand-
still agreement. What if the investor were to acquire a fifty-one 
percent interest in the investee? How long would the standstill 
have to last in this situation? What terms must the standstill con-
tain? 
The answer to these questions is uncertain, but the guiding 
principle would be that if, after the investment, the shareholders of 
the investee would be able to get a full takeover premium for their 
shares, a Revlon event probably has not have occurred. 133 
3. Defensive Response to a Takeover Threat 
If a joint venture agreement, or its equity investment compo-
nent, is deemed to be a defensive maneuver of the type described 
in Unocal and its progeny, for the board to be protected by the 
business judgment rule, the board's actions must survive what the 
Delaware courts call "enhanced review." To satisfy the first prong 
of the Unocal review and show that a potential unsolicited take-
over bid would be inimical to corporate effectiveness andpolicy, it 
is enough that the board establish that it acted in good faith and 
Ill See, e.g., In re Unitrin, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 1994 De. Ch. LEXIS 187, at *15, 
1994 WL 698483 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13. 1994), rev'd on other ground sub nom., Unitrin, Inc. v. 
American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995) In the context of a stock repurchase program 
initiated by certain stockholder directors in response to a takeover threat, that the stock repur-
chase program was reviewable under Unoca/ and did not trigger Rev/on scrutiny: 
Unitrin's stockholder directors will have none of these powers [enunci-
ated by the QVC court] - they will only acquire the ability to block a 
merger with another company. The stockholder directors will acquire 
control over the decision whether to sell Unitrin, but the public stock-
holders will still receive their control premium if those directors decide 
to sell. The transfer of the decision whether to sell the corporation to the 
stockholder directors in response to American General's offer is a defen-
sive action that must be evaluated under Unocal, not a transfer of control 
that requires the directors to maximize short term stockholder value in 
accordance with Rev/on. 
!d. (emphasis added). 
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upon reasonable investigation. 134 To satisfy the second prong of 
the Unocal review, the proportionality test, the board must estab-
lish that the challenged transaction is "not Draconian" in nature. 135 
The term "not Draconian" was later explained as referring to a 
measure that is "not either coercive or preclusive. " 136 If the meas-
ure is "not Draconian," then the U nocal proportionality test guides 
the enhanced judicial scrutiny towards the "the range of reason-
ableness."137 
Prominent commentators have noted that, as applied, the 
Unocal enhanced scrutiny is merely a "dressed up" business judg-
ment review. For instance, Professors Gilson and Black see Uno-
cal review as "primarily a formal, rhetorical instruction rather than 
a substantive standard of review."138 The Delaware Supreme Court 
itself seems to have endorsed this view. The Court's analysis in 
Unitrin Inc., v. American General Corp. suggests strongly that 
"Draconian" measures are only those of extreme nature. The 
Court itself emphasized its careful choice of words, and defined 
"Draconian" literally, as: 
Of or pert. to Draco, an archon and member of the Athenian 
eupatridae, or the code of laws which is said to have been 
framed about 621 B.C. by him as thesmothete. In them the 
penalty for most offenses was death, and to a later age they 
seemed so severe that they were said to be written in blood. 
Hence, barbarously severe; harsh; cruel. 139 
Delaware law would suggest that joint venture agreements, 
where undertaken with an expectation of profit and as a means of 
leveling risks, would survive Unocal review. Furthermore, as the 
134 See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (citation omitted); see also Aquila, Inc. v. Quanta Ser-
vices, Inc., 805 A.2d 196, 206 (Del. Ch. 2002) ("[T]he first element of the U nocal test is satis-
fied by evidence of the directors' good faith and reasonable investigation. Here, where a major-
ity of the members of the Special Committee that authorized the [defensive maneuver] are out-
side, independent directors, such evidence of good faith and reasonable investigation is 'materi-
ally enhanced."'). 
135 Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 ("As we have noted, [the board's] duty of care extends to 
protecting the corporation and its owners from perceived harm whether a threat originates from 
third parties of other shareholders. But such powers are not absolute. A corporation does not 
have unbridled discretion to defeat any perceived threat by any Draconian means available."). 
136 Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1387-88. A measure is not coercive where it is not aimed at 
"cramming down" on shareholders a management-sponsored alternative. Paramount Comm., 
Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154-55 (Del. 1989). A measure is not preclusive where it 
does not strip the "stockholders of their rights to receive tender offers" and did not "fundamen-
tally restrict proxy contests." Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1357 (Del. 1985). 
137 Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1388 (citing Paramount Comm., Inc., 637 A.2d at 45-46). 
138 RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARDS. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPOMTE 
ACQUISITIONS 849 (David L. Shapiro eta!. eds., 2d ed. 1995). 
139 Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1383-84 n.34 (citing WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTION-
ARY 780 (2d ed. 1951)) (emphasis added). 
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foregoing pages establish, because ancillary equity investments are 
sometimes essential to the success of the venture, it is likely that 
they will survive Unocal review as well, ·especially where some 
safeguards described in this Article are considered or adopted. 
Nonetheless, the board of directors of the investee company 
should take adequate steps, and ensure that it understands all the 
terms of the agreement, especially the implications the venture and 
investment will have on the potential takeover premium that may 
become available to shareholders of the company. 
CONCLUSION 
As this Article demonstrates, joint ventures are complex vehi-
cles which present challenges for the venturing parties, as well as 
public policy issues. When structuring a joint venture transaction, 
the parties should pay particular attention to the strategic purposes 
underlying the decision to employ a joint venture, rather than some 
other vehicle. In addition, the parties should focus upon the im-
pact a particular structure or particular contractual provisions 
could have not only on the governance and control of the venture 
itself, but, perhaps more importantly, upon the governance and 
control of the venturing parties. 
